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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DIRECT IMPORT BUYERS'
ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff -Appellant,
Case No. 13966
K.S.L., INC.,
Defendant-Respondent,

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for slander and libel. The case is as
stated in appellant's original brief.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment from which this appeal is taken.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the summary judgment and a
remand of the case to the lower court for trial on the merits.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts have been stated previously in appellant's original
brief.
ARGUMENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Respondent contends that the case before the court should
have, more properly, been characterized as a cause of action under
"disparagement of good" or, more accurately speaking, an action in
"injurious falsehood," Although such an action could have been brought
under the facts of this case, it would not have been sufficiently broad to
permit recovery for appellant's primary complaint; namely, that
respondent's employee, Lynn Packer, suggests in his commentary that
appellant may have been selling a product which was illegal under some
state or federal antipollution law. Such an accusation is an attack on
the person and not of the product, and the remedy is therefore an action
in defamation and not injurious falsehood.
Notwithstanding the reason for appellant's choice of causes
of action, respondent's remedy is a motion to dismiss which should
have been made in the lower court* Such a motion is not before the
court on this appeal. Furthermore, even if this case had been brought
under an injurious falsehood claim, the case would not have been proper
for summary judgment since numerous factual questions remain to be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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determined by the t r i e r of the facts.
POINT I
THE QUESTION OF TRUTH OR FALSITY OF
THE STATEMENTS COMPLAINED OF IS A
QUESTION FOR THE TRIER OF THE FACTS.
There is little question that truth is a complete defense to
defamationc The difficulty of respondent's position is that the question
of the truth o r falsity of the statements complained of by the appellant
has not been determined by the t r i e r of the facts. This question alone
is sufficient to merit a trial of the i s s u e s .
Under Point I of respondent's brief, respondent argues that
Lynn Packer accurately stated the positions of his sources even if the
sources 1 information was not accurate, and therefore the respondent
should be exonerated. Respondent overlooks the long established rule
that the publication o r repetition of defamation is itself actionable. The
rule is clearly stated in Prosser, Law of Torts, Hornbook Series § 108,
at 787 (3d ed. 1964):
Every repetition of the defamation is a publication
in itself, even though the repeater states the
source, o r r e s o r t s to the customary newspaper
evasion Mit is alleged," o r makes it clear that he
does not himself believe the imputation. The
courts have said many times that the last u t t e r ance may do no l e s s harm than the first, and that
the wrong of another cannot serve as an excuse
to the defendant. Likewise every one who takes
part in the publication, as in the case of the
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owner, editor, printer, vendor, o r even c a r r i e r
of a newspaper is charged with publication,
although so far as strict liability is concerned
the responsibility of some of these has been
somewhat relaxed.
POINT II
FAIR COMMENT ON A MATTER OF PUBLIC
INTEREST, IN AND OF ITSELF, DOES NOT
PROVIDE RESPONDENT WITH IMMUNITY OR
PRIVILEGE.
Respondent contends that the statements complained of were
fair comment upon a matter of public interest and therefore privileged 0
This contention is not substantiated by either the Utah statutes o r judicial
decisions« Section 45-2-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953) defines the
privileged publications. Fair comment on a matter of public interest is
not one of the privileges provided by statute.
In a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court
refused to extend the privilege and immunity to m a t t e r s of public interest
where no public official o r public figure was involved. In Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 94 So Ct. 2997 (1974), the Supreme Court of the
United States reviewed the question of privilege and immunity in a defamation suit involving "a matter of public interest" where no public official
or public figure was involved. The plaintiff was in fact a private individual c The United States Supreme Court reversed its e a r l i e r decision
relating to "matters of public interest" involving private individuals or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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private plaintiffs which was enunciated in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) and held that the defendant was not protected
by privilege or immunity in discussing "a matter of public issue" where
a private plaintiff was involved. See also Brigham Young University Law
Review, Volume I, at 159 thru 171 (1975).
The citations submitted by the respondent under Point II begs
the issue before the court and refers to matters which are considered
privileged, true, or relating to public officials or public figures. As the
appellant has stated previously in its initial brief on appeal, questions of
privilege, truth, public figures or public officials are to be determined
by the jury together with all other evidence.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT'S FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ARE NOT VIOLATED BY THE ACTION.
The United States Supreme Court has reviewed the question
of the First Amendment protection in three leading defamation suits.
In each of these cases the Supreme Court has outlined the prerequisites
for a successful suit taking into consideration the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court set the standards for cases dealing with
defamation of a public official. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967), the United States Supreme Court set the standards for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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prosecution of a defamation action involving public figures as distinguished from public officials 0

In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,

supra, the privileges and immunities of the p r e s s were extended to cases
involving "public i s s u e s . " However, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
supra, the United States Supreme Court reversed its position on c a s e s
involving "public i s s u e s . " Each of these c a s e s dealt with the question
of the F i r s t or Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and the question of freedom of the p r e s s . Under the guidelines set by
the United States Supreme Court in the three leading c a s e s cited, the
freedom of the p r e s s was deemed to be adequately protected.
POINT IV
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPERLY
GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
The appellant has previously submitted its argument on why
it believes that summary judgment was improper in the instant c a s e . In
a brief outline form appellant believes that the following issues remain
to be determined by the t r i e r of fact:
1.

Were the statements complained of true o r false.

2.

Did the defendant exercise reasonable c a r e in d e t e r mining the truth or falsity of the statements published by the defendant as required by Section
45-2-7, Utah Code Annotated, as amended (1953).

3c

Did the defendant or its employee, Lynn Packer,
maliciously publish false statements o r withhold
information from the viewing public to distort

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

the statements made and to intentionally
injure the plaintiff,
4.

If any statements published by the defendant
were false, is the defendant entitled to a
claim of privilege or immunity for the false
statements published.
CONCLUSION

The defendant claims that the statements published by it are
true and therefore not actionable. Questions of truth or falsity of a
statement are to be determined by the trier of fact and should not have
been determined by motion of summary judgment. Notwithstanding the
fact that the comments made may have been of a matter of public interest,
the United States Supreme Court in the Gertz decision has held that
matters of public interest not involving a public official or a public figure
do not provide immunity or privilege for false statements. The United
States Supreme Court has further held that defamation suits, prosecuted
under the guidelines of the Sullivan, Curtis, and Gertz decisions, do not
violate the First Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and freedom of the press 0 Since numerous issues of
fact remain to be determined, summary judgment was not proper in this
case; and appellant respectfully submits that the case should be remanded
to the District Court of Salt Lake County for trial.
Respectfully submitted,
KENNETH M 0 HiSATAKE
Attorney for Appellant
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